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Introduction
South Korea’s Daewoo Logistics, using no discretion, announced its successful
acquisition of 1.3 million hectares of farmland in Madagascar three years ago. One-half
of the island nation’s arable land was up for negotiation. Hypothetically, Daewoo could
export all produce from the ambitious maize and palm oil plantations and import all
personnel, as Malagasy investment laws stipulated no labor requirements.1 With few
taxable strings attached, meager job creation prospects for the Malagasy people and
virtually no rental terms, the announcement of the 99-year lease stirred public outrage
and proved consequential in the ousting of President Marc Ravalomanana in 2009. A
Wikileaks cable disclosed the flustered attempt by the Malagasy Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to deny the transaction, stating that the deal was not yet approved, nor had it
moved past the first stage of “land prospecting.”2 Nevertheless, the swift coup d’etat
followed after 130 people were killed during violent protests organized by an opposition
party. Later findings, unexamined by news headlines, suggest that the “Daewoo affair”
was an unseemly outgrowth of Ravalomanana’s previous efforts to liberalize trade and
position his own companies to reap the benefits in critical sectors.3
This phenomenon is not uncommon. Daewoo’s notorious failure in Madagascar
did not halt the successful, worldwide transfer of 45 million hectares of land to foreign
investors by early 2011.4 This paper addresses the global “land grab” issue exclusively in
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Explained in greater detail in: “Marc the medici? The failure of a new form of neopatrimonial rule in
Madagascar,” by R. Marcus, 2010, Political Science Quarterly, 125, p. 111-131. Various news agencies
also reported on the acquisition. See: “Daewoo to pay nothing for vast land acquisition,” S. Jung-a, C.
Oliver, & T. Burgis, 20 November 2008, Financial Times. Retrieved from:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b0099666-b6a4-11dd-89dd-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1gUPqYJk9
2
For a link to the cable leak, go here: http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19168
3
Marcus, “Neopatrimonial rule in Madagascar,” 2010.
4
“The politics of agrofuels and mega-land and water deals: insights from the ProCana case, Mozambique,”
S. M. Borras Jr, D. Fig, & S. M. Suarez, 2011, Review of African Political Economy, 38, p. 215-234.
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relation to Africa, where over two-thirds of these mega-land deals transpire.5 Foreign
investments in African commercial agriculture are commonly discussed within the
framework of neo-colonialism or, conversely, in prescriptions offered to investors by
international organizations with attempts to make the investments more “responsible”.6
While bringing into focus both the investors and global trends driving the surge in
commercial appetite for African farmland, popular narratives pay little attention to the
host government’s policies and role in facilitating the investments and expropriation of
peasant land. This concern is central to my research question: why do African ruling
elites choose policies that promote these investments?
In this paper, I contend that shifting the discussion would better shed light on the
relationship between current investment trends and neoliberal reforms in Africa, without
condemning foreign investment altogether or further polarizing international debates on
the matter. To be more precise, in highlighting the role of the state, we will better
understand both the real implications of “land grabbing” for African societies and how
the pursuit of investment and related reforms fit into everyday state practices – that is, the
very ways that governance is orchestrated in African states along local, global, formal,
and informal lines. Determining the relative influence of external actors and
organizations in shaping these practices requires an analysis of two approaches that will
be explored in this paper: the externalist approach and the neo-patrimonial approach. I
hypothesize that the project of Frelimo elites cannot be fully captured by the externalist
approach and that the party instead makes deliberate use of these reforms as a tactic to
5

“Vast bio-fuel demand drives ‘land grabs’”, 28 February 2011, America: Signs of the Times.
Among them: “Principles for responsible agricultural investment that respects rights, livelihoods, and
resources,” World Bank, 2010, Washington DC; Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural
investment and international land deals in Africa, L. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard, & J. Keeley, 2009,
London: IIED, FAO, IFAD.
6
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manage and control a network of domestic actors while maintaining the flow of external
resources into a reorganized clientelist system – what Foucault called “governmentality”
and what Bayart termed “extraversion”.7 Ruling elite factions happily employ certain
neoliberal reforms, such as removing investment regulations, capital restrictions, and
“inefficient” social service programs or state functions. These are but a series of practices
that sustain financial support from IFIs/aid donors and paradoxically centralize partystate control over the economy, the political system, and access to socioeconomic
mobility.
Layout of the paper
In the first section, I describe in greater depth the trends and actors driving the
global land rush and the implications this wave of investments may have for African
economies and citizens. A continental overview will be followed by current debates on
the “land grab” question and a brief account of mega-land deals in Mozambique. The
second section will review scholarly literature concerned with neoliberalism, economic
reform across Africa, and theories on elite policymaking. This will introduce the two
debates, as well as current work that transcends both approaches. Theory will then be
supplemented by a third section recounting the historical shift of Mozambique’s ruling
party from socialist, one-party rule through a series of liberal reforms and brief stint as a
multiparty democracy, followed by the return to a single party-state system. Both the
history of reform and contradictory trends in current reforms (e.g. reversal of democratic
reforms) will be discussed in regards to the externalist approach (where neocolonial
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“Governmentality” is briefly discussed in “The political economy of global neoliberal governance,” M.
De Angelis, 2005, in Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 28, p. 229-257. Gillian Hart expands the definition
as “strategic interventions exercised delicately and at a distance to transform citizens into consumers and
entrepreneurial subjects who will take responsibility for themselves,” when describing neoliberalism in
South Africa. (2008; pg. 689).
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adherents would fall) and the neopatrimonial approach. External factors that hastened the
transition to a post-socialist Mozambique in the 1980s and 1990s continue to influence
the regime as it now expeditiously implements neoliberal reforms, but the degree has
changed. I will then also apply the two hypotheses to current reforms to land and
investment laws. Next, I will test the “externalist hypothesis” using measures of foreign
aid flows, loans, and conditionality to determine continued foreign influence on
policymaking. This will be followed by tests of the “neo-patrimonial” hypothesis,
hearkening back to previous reform processes, interviews, NGO activity within
Mozambique, and an inspection of how farmland has been leased to foreign investors.
Both approaches will be evaluated and compared in relation to the findings and my
thesis. In the final section, I will relate my findings to future research imperatives for
analyzing neoliberal projects and foreign investment in other African states and what
effects these studies will have on scholarly and policy-related discussions of Africa’s
“place” in the wider world.
Foreign commercial agriculture is an important topic to consider in current
discussions about the African political economy. Foreign investment in this sector has
become an integral part of current economic policymaking strategies among African
ruling elites, albeit in an unprecedented fashion. For instance, governments have
extended liberalization beyond improving conditions for investment to encompass
sweeping reforms governing the rights and access to land. Consider Ethiopia and
Mozambique, where foreign land leases were legalized in 1996 and 1997 respectively.
Popular journalistic and activist accounts hold that land conflicts and other
socioeconomic consequences for rural communities are precipitated by the external
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imposition of interests and reforms, an updated neo-colonialism. However, this approach
gives only piecemeal attention to the current role of ruling elites and therefore does not
fully recognize the inconsistencies of these reforms and state policymaking gestures that
alone impede potential development opportunities foreign investment might otherwise
bring. Neoliberal reforms have often been unevenly applied, though wholly encouraged
by donors, the World Bank, and the IMF. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of academic literature
analyzing African neoliberal reforms during the past few decades deplore the chilling
effects of the neoliberal model on state institutions, economies, societies, and
development. Given the troubling history and current public outcry in various African
civil societies, the tenacious return to neoliberal reform now is perplexing, if we take
“neocolonialism” as our vantage point. With that in mind, exploring why African states
actively pursue large-scale foreign agricultural investments and broader neoliberal
reforms bears upon questions of state practices, autonomy, and foreign influences in the
current reform era. Again, these questions are inevitably tied up with current insights into
what African governance or the African state looks like.
As many large-scale projects fail to pan out and investors close operations or
withdraw completely, their very character reveals that Mozambique’s neoliberal turn is in
actuality, only partial and asymmetrical. In this way, the neo-patrimonial approach may
better capture how the African state navigates reform while under some influence from
external forces. However, like the dominant parties of other African states, in
Mozambique there are clearly separate “factions” of Frelimo and it is unfair to surmise
that elite orientations are homogenous. Though there is a dominant and identifiable
“predatory group”, there is also a faction genuinely working for development ends. This
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differentiation is also emphasized by Fairbairn (2011) and Buur et. al (2011) who
conducted extensive interviews within the country. Unlike other African states, Frelimo
has enjoyed its position as a one-party state since independence in 1975 and has created a
patronage system first beholden to urban support from middle classes, support which has
recently eroded. Scholars have pointed to a shift in Frelimo’s support base, as the party
increasingly favors a domestic capitalist class and foreign investors.8 What emerges is a
“neoliberal” non-governmental state in which access to state structures is still crucial but
the state simultaneously withdraws from traditional functions (developmentalist work and
social policies), outsourcing these functions to NGOs or private companies. This
“neoliberal governmentality” involves a complex constellation of influences that is
insufficiently accounted for in the externalist approach.
Snatched? An overview of global land grabbing
Universal crises involving food and energy security have coalesced to instigate a
unique shift in strategy amongst governments and transnational firms to buy or lease
fertile land in the developing world. The competition for preferential access to land is
unprecedented. It is estimated that 15-20 million hectares of farmland in developing
nations changed hands between 2006 and 2009.9 Liken these figures to World Bank
estimates in late 2010, which totaled 45 million, and now 80 million total hectares
projected in 2011, and the escalating trend of these “mega-land deals” is striking.10
Whether driven by profit, or a means to bypass the volatile global market for food prices
8

J. Sumich, “Politics after the time of hunger,” 2008, p. 333-334; J. Sumich, “Frelimo and social
stratification,” 2010; J. Hanlon, “Renewed land debate,” 2004.
9
L. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, & J. Keeley, Land grab or development opportunity?: agricultural investment
and international land deals in Africa, 2009.
10
Borras et al, 2011, “Politics of agrofuels and mega-land and water deals,” 215-234; Deininger, K. and D.
Byerlee with J. Lindsay, A. Norton, H. Selod, & M. Stickler, 2010, Rising global interest in farmland: can
it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?; The Economist, 5 May 2011, “Evidence is piling up against
acquisitions of farmland in poor countries.” Retrieved from http://africanliberty.org/node/1173.
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and supply, or perhaps to seek viable avenues for bio-fuels production, these actors
intend to grow and export crops on suitable soil – and predominantly African soil.11
Borras and Franco describe land grabbing as the “catch-all phrase to refer to the
current explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions mainly revolving
around the production and export of food, animal feed, biofuels, timber, and minerals.”12
Governments and sovereign wealth funds from China, India, Saudi Arabia, and South
Korea (among others) are also predominant actors; these regions are facing the
intertwined crises of spikes in global food prices, population booms, desertification, and
burgeoning middle classes demanding a diversified diet. Securing farmland in the
developing world, where land is perceived as “underutilized”, cheap, and abundant, is a
new if controversial strategy for attaining food security. If the era of low global prices for
grains is over, states with a well-developed agricultural sector and little land pressure are
in an envious position for maintaining domestic stability; indeed a report released by the
World Bank in June 2010 announced that 44 million people have been pushed into
poverty due to the global price spikes.13 Because the growing interest spans both food
concerns and programs in Western Europe to cut carbon emissions and pursue alternative
fuels, more cultivated land has also been diverted from food crops to biofuels. The United
States, historically serving as the world’s emergency reserve for grain, has been
converting millions of tons of grain (now over ¼ of total harvest) into ethanol every year.
If it becomes increasingly profitable to convert grain into fuel, the price of grain may rise
11

Over 60% of allocations took place in African states; in 2011 this totals approximately 48 million
hectares alone in Africa. This figure appeared in “Vast bio-fuel demand drives ‘land grabs’” in America:
Signs of the Times (28 February 2011).
12
S. M. Borras Jr & J. Franco, “Global land grabbing and trajectories of agrarian change: a preliminary
analysis,” 2011, Journal of Agrarian Change, 12: 34-59.
13
“Let them eat bread: how food subsidies prevent (and provoke) revolutions in the Middle East,” A.
Ciezadlo, 23 March 2011, Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67672/annia-ciezadlo/let-them-eat-bread.
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to match fluctuations in oil prices. Speculative demand for land then, is in part a
consequence of the newly lucrative biofuels industry.
Perceptions of abundant cheap land, few overhead costs, and little government
regulation have led to many ambitious and controversial deals or “land grabs”. While
certain high-profile acquisitions have failed, these blunders have not short-circuited the
approval of hundreds of other projects. This trend is by no means decreasing; nor has the
scale of these individual projects been tempered. Daewoo’s attempt to lease 1.3 million
hectares for 99 years to produce corn and palm oil and the ousting of the Malagasy
president that followed was an isolated but powerful incident. Some governments will
cancel deals where companies do not develop the land according to an agreed timeline;
other projects may be downsized. Karuturi Global Ltd, an Indian firm, successfully
secured 300,000 ha in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. But in May 2011, Ethiopia’s
federal government reduced the allocation as agricultural ministers allegedly realized that
a 1,160 square mile project is unmanageable.14 Saudi Star has been more successful and
plans to spend $2 billion acquiring 500,000 ha of land in the same country. Their newly
erected greenhouses already supply wheat, rice, vegetables, and flowers for the Saudi
market.15 Other projects include “carbon credit” and timber farms– such as the Malonda
Foundation’s 60,000 ha intended for eucalyptus and pine trees in the Niassa Province of
Mozambique.16 The array of actors from Western and non-Western states complicate the
neo-colonial indictment.
14

“Ethiopian Government Slashes Karuturi Global Land Concession,” William Davison, 4 May 2011,
Business Week. Retrieved from: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-04/ethiopian-governmentslashes-karuturi-global-land-concession.html
15
“How food and water are driving a 21st century land grab,” J. Vidal, 6 March 2010, The Guardian.
Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/07/food-water-africa-land-grab.
16
Lords of the land: preliminary analysis of the phenomenon of land grabbing in Mozambique, N. Matavel
& S. D. V. Cabanelas, 2011, Justiça Ambiental/UNAC: Maputo.
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These projects are situated in states riddled with poverty and food insecurity. And
though issues related to land tenure, rights, and access are still very controversial in most
African states (where much of the land is state or community owned), large-scale
agricultural investments are now actively endorsed by governments and facilitated by
investment promotion agencies in these countries. 17 Moreover, and compounding
domestic struggles in food production, many African governments don’t seem terribly
attentive to register their own communities in new demarcations, though some
governments have been inclined to either partially or fully privatize state-owned land. For
example, Ethiopia has avoided privatizing state-owned land but under the Derg reforms,
ironically guarantees access to government-controlled leases for mostly foreign
companies. On the one hand, most African states were previously reluctant to privatize
land, not to mention leasing or selling it to foreign companies in a tense post-colonial era
where doing so would look like the antithesis of independence and delegitimize the ruling
party. On the other hand, not only is the history of neoliberal policymaking in Africa
widely considered lamentable – as evidenced by innumerous academic accounts of
African neoliberal “travails”18 – but the global financial crisis seems to have compelled a
global shift away from the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus

17

Since the 1980s, “investment promotion agencies” or IPAs have been established and institutionalized in
over 150 countries, a development encouraged in part by the UN and the IMF. We might say that the
proliferation of these agencies reflects the competition amongst governments for FDI, though their role in
investments varies across states. These centers serve as proxies for foreign investors, but more
importantly, they often function as a state agency to monitor, screen, and restrict investment. Increasingly,
they are used as a marketing mechanism to attract investment. If the role played by these IPAs has
expanded in other states besides Mozambique - especially in regards to investments in farmland - there is
little or no commentary by scholars on IPAs.
18
“Economic faith, social project and a misreading of African society: the travails of neoliberalism in
Africa,” G. Harrison, 2005, Third World Quarterly, 26: 1303-1320.
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towards a Beijing Consensus.19 That is, state capitalism paired with regulation or
restrictions on investment and the financial sector seem to be more widely preferred as
policy options across the developing world and even in the EU.20 Nevertheless, various
African regimes are moving toward free-market policies that send a most fervent message
to foreign investors and corporations: “We are open for business!” So paltry are the terms
and tremendous the interest – “land grabbing” is but the newest manifestation driving and
being driven by policymaking. But existing work on African politics and elite
policymaking doesn’t seem content to discuss these issues strictly in terms of “rentseeking.” What other frameworks have been offered?
Invoking a familiar stigma: neocolonialism?
Foreign, large-scale land acquisitions have led to a compelling accusation on the
part of NGOs, civil society organizations, and international media: commercial
agricultural investments (or “land grabs”) bespeak a new era of neo-colonialism.
The neo-colonial thesis contends that former colonial powers and the international
financial institutions under their control actively (if discreetly) continue to exploit former
colonies, and that the skewed economic relationships characterized by colonial rule are
left largely intact and consistently reproduced. This top-down phenomenon involves the
19

“Washington Consensus” refers to the set of neoliberal development policies promoted by the IMF and
World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s, involving economic liberalization, privatization, export-led
growth, and little government intervention in the economy. Some have argued that there has been a shift to
a “Post-Washington Consensus”, or a move away from policy conditionality and toward a goal of poverty
reduction and “country ownership” of policy-making. Nevertheless, the same neo-liberal policy package is
unchanged, though there is new focus on governance and social policy. For more, see: “Toward an
inclusive-neoliberal regime of development: from the Washington to the Post-Washington consensus,” A.
Ruckert, 2006, Labour, Capital, & Society, 39: 34-67.

20

The Beijing Consensus refers to the “Chinese economic growth model” widely defined as involving
long-term strategies, greater government interference, corporate and bank allegiance to the government,
and a more regulated market. Heads of State such as President Jacob Zuma have directly referred to the
Chinese model of a “developmental state” as desirable where market forces alone may be insufficient for
national goals of job creation and building infrastructure. See: http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-03-zumaadopts-chinese-model/
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question of power imbalances between Western and non-Western governments as well as
dependencies masked by the “trappings of international sovereignty” – where
responsibility for developmental woes is ascribed to post-colonial governments, even as
their political and economic systems are somewhat directed from the outside.21 Foreign
capital is thus understood to be used not for development, but for the exploitation of these
less developed regions. Understood this way, “land grabbing” is an attempt by former
colonial powers, their companies, and IFIS to impose policies on African states that allow
for these investments and extraction of crops to transpire, under the banner of
“development”. Existing power imbalances leave African governments unable to
negotiate the terms. Consequently, the static colonial relationship is maintained; African
states remain exporters of raw materials – their land commodified, re-parceled. But neocolonialism’s applicability as an analytical and explanatory tool may not be very useful
today if neoliberal reforms related to foreign agricultural investments are driven in large
part by internal, local mechanisms and not simply imposed by external actors – be they
investors, multinational corporations, or international financial institutions. Marking a
stark departure from previous decades of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) imposed
by aid donors and international financial institutions, the use of strictly “externalist” or
“neocolonialist” accounts to explain the move towards neoliberalism in African states is
insufficient to capture current realities.22

21

Neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism, K. Nkrumah, 1965.
Recent scholarly work on farmland acquisitions and bio-fuels in Africa discuss the limits of the
externalist account as well: “Indirect expropriation: the role of national institutions and domestric elites in
the Mozambican farmland grab,” M. Fairbairn, 2011 April 6-8, LDPI/Journal of Peasant Studies (presented
at International Conference on Global Land Grabbing); S. Borras et al, 2011, “Politics of agro-fuels in
mega-land and water deal,” 215-234.

22
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“Development” and its discontents
FIAN International, GRAIN, and La Via Campesina (among others) represent
small farmers and peasant communities across the developing world. These groups
convened in the summer of 2011 to articulate the Dakar Appeal, which demands that all
massive agribusiness land grabs be ceased and that mandatory guidelines for respecting
peasants’ rights to the land be established by the UN’s World Food Security committee
(CFS).23 This appeal was then presented to the G20 Forum in France. Indeed, as African
governments hand over parcels of land to foreign companies under the official banner of
“development opportunities”, allegations of villagers forcefully evicted from communal
lands, left displaced and uncompensated, give credibility to the neo-colonial indictment.24
In response to these ongoing accusations, a spate of reports were released by the World
Bank, FAO, IFAD, and others to recognize the risks of these investments, provide data on
various projects, and impart policy recommendations and conditions that would make
these investments “work for development”.25 Pledging full-time jobs during
consultations, recent surveys of the few projects actually running show little rural job
creation. A World Bank report found one Mozambican project that initially promised
2,650 jobs was in actuality hiring only 35-40 workers.26 Jobs may be seasonal and the
location of the projects may spawn new trends in migratory labor. Given the outcry from
civil society and unequal access to land tenure and credit, the acquisitions don’t seem like

23

“G-20 agriculture: hundreds of organizations say STOP farmland grabbing!” 20 June 2011, Food First:
Institute for food and development policy, retrieved from: http://www.foodfirst.org/en/land+grabs.
24
See Al Jazeera’s recent video release featuring the Ugandan case of 22,000 people allegedly forced from
their land as UK’s New Forest Company launches a 40,000 ha project. The video can be found here:
http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2011/09/2011922111515150690.html
25
Deininger, K. et al, Rising global interest in farmland, 2010; L. S. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard, &
J. Keeley, Land grab or development opportunity, 2009.
26
Deininger, K. et al, Rising global interest in farmland, 2010; The Economist, 5 May 2011, “Evidence is
piling up against acquisitions of farmland in poor countries.” Retrieved from
http://africanliberty.org/node/1173.
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an “easy fit” for a sustainable modus operandi of national development. Lester Brown’s
commentary captures other limitations in sparking a culture for commercial agriculture in
the developing world:
It could take many years to realize any substantial production gains. The public
infrastructure for modern market-oriented agriculture does not yet exist in most of Africa.
In some countries it will take years just to build the roads and ports needed to bring in
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and to export farm products. Beyond that, modern
agriculture requires its own infrastructure: machine sheds, grain-drying equipment, silos,
fertilizer storage sheds, fuel storage facilities, equipment repair and maintenance services,
well-drilling equipment, irrigation pumps, and energy to power the pumps.27

On the other hand, considering that these nations have suffered from decades of
underinvestment, notable scholars, such as Paul Collier, lamented that watchdog
organizations have dismissed the possibility of any benefit arising from these
investments.28 If not commercial agriculture, it is unclear what other promising channels
are feasible that will reduce the dependence of African nations on foreign food aid and
food imports. The romanticism associated with subsistence agriculture, African
peasantry, and “self-sufficiency” is unlikely to prove –and hasn’t proved – effective to
eliminate poverty and malnourishment. Collier explains the inefficacy of smallholder
techniques with the rising population of urban dwellers and urban slums; peasants
seeking real wages in formal jobs have abandoned farming to head to the cities.
Accelerating productivity by coordinating disparate smallholders is an unlikely strategy,
though Collier does not go to great depths to explain why. But it’s the very instance of
these divergent positions that polarize the “land grab” debate that prompt us to ask
critical questions about Africa’s integration (or lack thereof) into the global economy, its

27

“The new geopolitics of food,” L. R. Brown, May/June 2012, Foreign Policy. Accessed from:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food.
28
“The politics of hunger: how illusion and greed fan the food crisis,” P. Collier, 2010, Foreign Affairs, 87:
67-79.
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status within that system, and the likelihood that increased foreign investment will bear
fruit and for whom.
After the University of Sussex held an international conference on land grabbing
earlier in April 2011, analyzing over 100 deals, experts seem to conclude that the “results
are damning.”29 Because few states boast formal and transparent procedures that specify
the rights and obligations of all parties involved and those that do often ignore
longstanding laws on communal land tenure and use rights, its hardly unfathomable that
the conference would reach such a bold conclusion. Yet as projects fail to develop or
prospects disintegrate not long after investors acquire their land parcels, continued
debates about whether or not to write off the investments don’t seem quite right – and
they don’t seem to confront larger trends. The polemic atmosphere lingers, suggesting
that new questions must be asked and more critical analysis undertaken. Though it is
undeniable that the outlook for these investments is altogether rather bleak (both unlikely
to take off due to problems of infrastructure and misperception of costs and likely to
produce mixed results to the detriment of Africans), the trend begs for an explanation of
why African ruling elites seem to be encouraging these investments within broader
appeals for development. One might retort, point blank, “corruption!” and would sorely
overlook how ruling elites justify their policies and negotiate their positions within
market-inspired, neoliberal frameworks. It would also ignore the local and global
intersections where strategies to encourage “land grabbing” are chosen.
From a Mozambican angle
In 2009, the Republic of Mozambique released the “National Biofuels Policy and
Strategy”, ironically mimicking the former Portuguese colonial administration by
29

“Evidence is piling up against acquisitions of farmland in poor countries,” 5 May 2011, The Economist.
Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/18648855.
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encouraging farmers across the central and southern provinces to cultivate a single biofuel crop - jatropha. Unmatched by many Western governments, at first glance this policy
move seems strikingly progressive for promoting alternative energy solutions. But
unbeknownst to farmers at the time, jatropha hoards water that would otherwise be
devoted to food crops. Moreover, its yields vary widely as the plant species have yet to be
domesticated. Dismissing these complications, the plant was nevertheless “rediscovered”
in 2005 as a low-emissive and cheap fuel alternative by energy research institutes in
Japan and Indonesia, programs funded by car companies like Mitsubishi to honor the
Kyoto Protocol.30 Jatropha is one of the few biofuel crops that can be substituted for jet
fuel and was identified by Goldman Sachs in 2007 as one of the best alternatives for
diesel. Not long after this pronouncement, Mozambique was identified by the
International Energy Agency as boasting one of the largest biofuels production potentials
in Africa.31 A new wave of interested investors from Western Europe and Canada took
note, which in part spawned the Mozambican “land grab”. As most of these products are
not consumable by local markets and are wholly intended for export, it is unclear what
benefits exist for its citizens, especially rural populations. This is but one crop of interest
in Mozambique; others include sugarcane and maize.
At the outset, Mozambican elites spoke of “environmental protection” and
“sustainable energy for domestic consumption” with optimistic, persuasive vigor. And
farmers took to the fields, convinced that they would receive 10 meticals (1 met = 28
USD) for every kilogram of jatropha seed they produced. Recall that this is a country

30

“Jatropha oil: a promising, clean alternative energy,” Y. T. Suwarni, 2005 July 4, The Jakarta Post.
Retrieved from Energy Bulletin: http://www.energybulletin.net/node/7114.
31
Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Mozambique, I. Nhantumbo & A. Salomao, 2010.
Accessed from: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12563IIED.pdf
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where 75% of the Mozambican population engages in subsistence farming and 35% of all
households suffer from chronic food insecurity.32 Outsourcing biofuels production to a
developing country where the prospects for job creation and rural development are
dubious has placed Mozambique among the countries under heavy scrutiny from NGOs
that seek to protect the rural peasantry from the whims of investors.
By the end of 2009 and among sub-Saharan African states, Mozambique was
second only to Sudan in the number of total hectares allocated, before the government
froze all mega-land lease approvals pending the current Agricultural Zoning Process in
2010.33 Between 2006 and 2009, over 2.67 million hectares of land, or 405 documented
projects, were leased to investors in a country where all land is nationalized.34 As
Mozambique features prominently among states encouraging foreign large-scale
investments and because the state was determinedly socialist following the immediate
years of independence from Portuguese colonialism, it makes for a particularly curious
case with regards to neoliberal reforms. Furthermore, the ruling party Frelimo was
essentially forced (in desperation) to abandon its Stalinist-Leninist platform for Western
aid and liberal reform during a brutal 16-year-long civil war. Upon first glance, the
country’s experience with externally imposed structural adjustment and the government’s
enduring dependence on aid donors for over 50% of its annual budget may give weight to
the neo-colonial thesis. But Mozambique’s unique experience with colonialism and its
history as a Third World post-revolutionary regime suggests otherwise, as does the way
32
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in which current investments and reforms are being conducted. A deep-seated socialist
ideological platform long upheld by “old vanguard” elites in ministerial positions today
seems equally likely to affect the ruling party’s will to transition fully to a free market
economy, which also complicates the neocolonial approach. Likewise, because
neopatrimonial adherents hold that all African states are virtually indistinguishable in
their statecraft; past or present ideological tensions within the ruling party – or whether
the state’s experience is post-communist- are rendered inconsequential.
After reviewing the existing literature on neoliberalism in Africa, I will analyze
how Mozambique’s 1997 Land Law and its degree of political and economic
liberalization in general engender a more complex understanding of elite policymaking as
tied up with the workings and worldwide diffusion of free market globalization. Current
narratives would do well to incorporate how social actors (beyond states, companies, and
IGOs) feature within a global economy that simultaneously centralizes control within
state governments while rendering governments obsolete. “Land grabbing” is but a new
site where issues of state-building come back to the fore and where governments use
“free market” policies to reconstruct social, public, and private space and remake the
means for accumulation and privilege.
Literature on (neo)liberal governance in Africa
Recent scholarship on governance and policymaking in Africa consistently
employs neoliberalism to identify the forces that drive decision-making and reforms.
Within the range of approaches experts have devised to explain African policymakers’
choices related to economic liberalization, generally one or both of these overarching
axioms can be identified: the externalist approach or the agency approach. “Externalists”
generally conceive of changes related to liberalization as directed from the outside, the
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most glaring example being the IMF and World Bank’s imposition of structural
adjustments programs (SAPs) in the 1980s as a condition of debt-restructuring. Thus
changes to policymaking would be directly associated with external pressure from donor
agencies, IFIs, and even various organs of the UN; African governments are perceived to
have little control over their own social and economic policies – even today. Included in
this camp are Marxists, dependency theorists, and most adherents to post-colonial
literature. Conversely, the “agency approach” stresses the autonomy of African leaders in
making decisions, and would relate changes to policymaking to the political interests of
the state as well as the interests of influential groups within the regime’s support base.
These “agency” theorists typically accentuate the declining influence of external agents,
instead alluding to an altogether new structure of political constraints and opportunities
that has emerged within the current global political economy. As this structure affords
elites greater power in pursuing their own policy agendas, outright intervention by
foreign agents is minimal.
This binary opposition is admittedly problematic, like that of the structure-agent
debate, because “agency” adherents are quick to acknowledge that chronic conditions of
dependency do persist but stress the role of elites in maintaining those conditions. First
and foremost, this particular debate in Africa takes as its starting point the framework of
neoliberalism, which began and largely remains the model for development today. There
are problems in identifying Africa’s experience with neoliberalism as unique from other
regions or the rest of the world (an African exceptionalism), and deserving of exclusive
study and theoretical analysis. Patron-client relations are not unique to Africa. Yet this
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regional and sometimes continental focus is dominant among scholars and useful for the
purposes of this paper.
Neoliberalism: an ever-elusive but powerful paradigm
Neoliberalism was also central to the critiques of interviewees from NGOs and
the farmer’s organization UNAC whom I talked to while in Mozambique. The
proliferation of conceptual schemes used to define or evaluate neoliberalism is nearly
dizzying. As the concept grew popular in various American and British universities and
later as a policy package put forth in the Washington Consensus, it then stirred more
stigmatized commentary on state anomalies stemming from decades of these policies especially following their heavy-handed imposition during the 1980s. For instance, recent
research identifies current African manifestations of neoliberalism as “antipolitics”
(Buscher), hegemony resulting from the colonization of discourse (Adesina 2004; Peet;
Ayers), a national or universalized “social engineering project” (Hart 2008 ;Harrison);
and as market-based governmentality (Ferguson 2010; de Angelis). Others focus their
critique on the effects of adjustment on state capacity (Oya; Matanga 2010) or the ways
in which the African state has become a mouthpiece for global economic forces
(Soderbaum; Taylor 2003). Similarly, where the term has been conflated with the notion
of economic globalization, others associate African neoliberalism with the worldwide
spread of a right-wing art of government and the demise of Keynesianism and the
“developmentalist state” in the postwar era (Nasong’o 2004; Sassen 2010).35 Some
Constructivists call this seemingly uncontested hegemony and spread of market reforms
the “neoliberal norm” or to put it another way, the new “common sense” (Chwieroth).36
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It’s easy to get lost in the commotion. Nevertheless, as the concept has expanded
from macroeconomic fundamentals (or straightforward policy prescription) to an
adjective used to describe reconstructed governance institutions and the African state
itself, scholars have collectively deplored the heterogeneous outcomes of these policy
orientations – most notably the “complex and diverse experiences” in sub-Saharan
Africa.37 In this section, I will explore the history of neoliberalism and its uses, so to
delineate which permutation is appropriate to employ with regards to current policy shifts
in Mozambique accompanying mounting interest in the country’s fertile land.
To start, we will trace the trajectory of the concept. The reshaping of
neoliberalism over time is concurrent with shifts in scholars’ understandings of political
agency in Africa. A founding premise precluding the rise of neoliberal orthodoxy is that
free trade, private property rights, and unfettered markets lead to a richer and more
tolerant world. Furthermore, it was assumed that through the cooperation of states to
maintain international economic organizations (founded on these very principles), these
axioms would be spread worldwide.38 The WTO is but one forum where state
policymakers attempt to hold each other accountable to free trade agreements. But there
occurred a gradual and important departure from the mainstream liberal discourse, which
guided the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions in the late 1940s. “Embedded
liberalism” in the immediate postwar era held that state intervention in the economy was
necessary at times to support both national security and global stability, and indeed most
newly independent Third World states pursued development within the rubric of import
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substitution industrialization. Colossal increases in capital flows and “petrodollars”
allowed African states to borrow heavily in the 1970s and “embedded liberalism” fell
away as the aftermath of massive oil price hikes in 1979 led to equally massive rises in
the interest rates on loans that African governments were unable to pay back. Balance of
payments deficits and spiraling debt was blamed on the state-heavy approach to
development, and so it was that the “structural adjustment era” began and neoliberal
orthodoxy was gradually outlined throughout.39 Market triumphalism would further
embed the neoliberal paradigm with the fall of the Soviet Union and what Fukuyama
dubbed the “end of history” in 1989 – referring to the alleged end of competition between
ideologies, giving way to the task and problematique of extending democratic and
economic liberalism worldwide.40 Widespread consensus on the unfailing robustness of
these policies awarded the doctrine unmatched credibility, a phenomenon that intrigues
scholars even today:
The differences that remained among neoclassical economists were one of degree rather
than kind. Debates persisted within the profession about the importance of the pace and
sequencing of liberalization, but not of its long-run desirability…Remarkably, this
neoliberal consensus developed in the absence of unambiguous evidence confirming the
benefits of liberalization and persisted until the Asian financial crisis.41

Adesina would add that this consensus engendered an unprecedented “shrinking of policy
space”, which contrasted what maneuvering room developing governments enjoyed
during the 60s and 70s.42 Released by the World Bank in 1981, The Berg Report on
development in Sub-Saharan Africa emerged concurrently with mounting popular regard
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in Western media that cajoled these policies as the sure route for underdeveloped
countries to join the global economy.43 At the outset of the 1980s, this unanimity
pervaded development policy debates between the World Bank, IMF, and various UN
institutions. Where the indebted African postcolonial state was concerned, it was deemed
that market mechanisms were more efficient than state institutions in allocating resources
and delivering services, especially as African government intervention was believed to be
irreconcilably beholden to “rent-seeking, technological backwardness, and resource
misallocation.”44
The adjustment and post-adjustment era
Structural adjustment can then be understood as one of the early fragments of
African neoliberalism. It refers to the country-by-country intervention made on behalf of
the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s to prevent developing states from defaulting on
their loans and to ensure repayment to the teetering international banking system in two
forms: writing off or rescheduling the debt of countries that adopted market-oriented
strategies. Among experts, it was believed that shifting to an export-oriented economy
would incur the foreign exchange reserves necessary for these states to repay the debt.45
Turning strictly to neoclassical economics, a system of policy recommendations was then
doled out indiscriminately to countries, a package that became known (later, pejoratively)
as the “Washington Consensus.” Standard policy imperatives include measures to
“reduce inflation, government expenditure, and the role of the government in the
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economy, including trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.”46 The public
sector was to be compressed and reduced to make way for foreign investment and exportoriented growth. Later criticized for its narrow applications, adverse socioeconomic
repercussions, and its dismissal of the social relations that constitute and determine how a
“liberal market” works, it is also interesting to note that total African debt amounted to
$14.2 billion in 1974 and actually increased to over $150 billion by 1992.47 Though
structural adjustment was intended to help African states reduce and pay back debt,
governments during the era of adjustment became further and chronically indebted to the
World Bank and IMF, the very institutions that imposed these policies. The removal of
food subsidies that coincided with a contraction of government health and education
spending would mire the urban poor, rural farmers, and other disadvantaged groups
especially in relation to adult literacy rates and mortality rates. Instead of bringing Africa
in line with the “global model”, in 2001 Africa claimed only 1.1% of global GDP, 0.6%
of global foreign direct investment, and its average GNP per capita shrank 92% between
1970 and 1998.48 Average growth rates in sub-Saharan African states actively “adjusting”
dropped to an average 3.5%, revealing that the region was falling far behind adjusting
states elsewhere, a reality admitted by the World Bank in 1994.49
Policies that were intended to correct what was surely a significant degree of
inefficiency and corruption on the part of state institutions was arguably a drastic
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wresting of sovereignty and what Ferguson describes as “governance from afar”.50
Compounding issues of debt is the degree to which African states became dependent on
donors to finance a substantial chunk of their state budgets – even countries that were
labeled by the IMF as “adjustment success stories”. In 2000, two such success stories,
Ghana and Uganda, depended on foreign aid for 98% and 76% of their budgets,
respectively.51 International financial institutions, reflecting on the catastrophe of
structural adjustment in the 1980s, formulated a new strategy for the 1990s focused not
on “getting prices right” but on “getting governance right.” The shift to promoting
democratic governance at first seems strikingly different from the Washington
Consensus, but in reality only reinforced the same policy prescriptions and extended
neoclassical logic to the political sphere.
Rolling back while rolling out
The Post-Washington Consensus was developed to incorporate the “social” by
focusing on good governance and democratization in order to better correct for “market
imperfections.”52 During this era, many African states initiated multi-party elections and
the World Bank applauded democratic reforms, transparency, and accountability as
irreplaceable preconditions for economic development. In effect, the economic pitfalls of
the 1980s were directly and solely associated with the “extensive personalization of
power, widespread corruption, denial of fundamental human rights, and the prevalence of
unelected and unaccountable governments” in African states.53 Pro-poor policies and
improvements to the investment climate went hand-in-hand, though the IMF and World
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Bank wanted these efforts to be provided for not by governments but by NGOs through
the widening of “civil society”. The 1990s marked the extension of the neoliberal
doctrine from sole economic core considerations to include and transform the very fabric
of the “social”, beginning with state institutions. Where the SAPs of the ’80s had led to a
retrenchment and “rolling back” of state functions and capacity, the post-Washington
Consensus of the 1990s aimed to rebuild state capacity and “roll out” a new state that was
more technocratic, a public sector that was managed and operated in a business manner,
and programs based on incentives and output with the explicit goal to tackle poverty.54
And so it was that the “commercial principle” was inscribed into every realm of
traditional state functions and service delivery, not limited to health, education, social
security, sanitation, basic infrastructure, and even “pro-poor” programs.55
Though this latter “Consensus” is less orthodox, ambitious, and concerns itself
with interrelated issues of governance and poverty, most of the principles are vague and
can be reduced to the mere continuance both of strict economic liberalization and a boost
to the flow of loans, aid, and NGOs to cover what the private sector will not. Moreover,
the current state of affairs seem to suggest that both adjustment eras eroded central state
capacity and, contrary to one of its stated objectives, led to increased corruption, rentseeking, and greater inequality and marginalization for the majority of Africans.56
Richard Sandbrook is most concise in summing up the concerns of most scholars toward
the dual adjustment era:
The report (Post-Washington Consensus) largely ignores or underplays the socio-political
realities that will shape the success of this ambitious enterprise. Nor does it analyze
several difficult dilemmas and trade-offs that will ensue. Unleashing entrepreneurship in
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Africa – extending the sway of market exchange, in other words – involves nothing less
than a Great Transformation in countries where, for many people, economic behavior is
governed by the institutions of redistribution and/or reciprocity rather than (or in addition
to) market exchange.57

Derived from a deductive model, neoliberal policies from the outset are not great
predictors of what they set forth to accomplish. In the case of Africa, experts across the
board have illustrated how the adjustments actually moved Africa in a direction that
“separates it further from the rest of the world,” giving us due reason to study African
neoliberalism as a separate analytical category.58 While it is unclear whether or not
African states have truly entered a post-Washington Consensus era, conditions for
policymaking have changed. We can draw three conclusions from these two “waves” of
neoliberal restructuring: First, throughout the post-colonial era, economic restructuring
has not transformed or altered Africa’s role as a provider of raw materials to the global
economy.59 While still exporting cash crops, now there is a quasi-privatized market for
farmland. Second, it is necessary to have a historically embedded conception of
neoliberalism to begin to understand how related reforms remain imposed but also
wielded by African state policymakers. Third, scholars have long discussed the effects of
structural adjustment and neoliberalism in Africa and most accounts condemn these
policies. While the current African “state” is itself an effect of neoliberal adjustments (as
are trends in policymaking), scholars diverge in their analysis of how “strong” or “weak”
the African state is while contributing different theories about the current pursuit of
reforms. The next section will compare specific scholars’ accounts of why neoliberal
policies are still pursued, recalling the externalist and agency approaches discussed
57
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previously. Overall, how scholars interpret reforms in Africa will likely relate to their
interpretation of elite politics in Africa. In analyzing why elites may pursue neoliberal
reforms, I suggest that the “neopatrimonial approach” is most accurate – and that aid
flows and conditionality have little impact on the decisions of elite policymakers.
Competing Explanations for Neoliberal Reform
Externalists
Scholars in the externalist cadre usually appropriate a “weak state” thesis to
explain both the imposition of policies and African dependency on foreign largesse.
Shadrack W. Nasang’o, while reviewing four decades of political and economic liberal
reforms across African states, concludes that dictatorship has left the political realm for
the economic realm, and equates new forms of authoritarian economism with external
encumbrance. While states require more loans and debt rescheduling, IFIs use their
“potent (financial) wherewithal to force their shock therapy measures on unwilling but
vulnerable states.”60 His argument draws heavily from international agreements made in
the 1990s on the rights of MNCs and banks, the entrenchment of trade liberalization
norms in the WTO, and figures of debt and unemployment on the African continent.
Similarly, Frank K. Matanga also emphasizes the African state’s reduced capacity to
govern; state leaders must continually acquiesce to adjustment conditions to contain their
debt crises. However, Matanga focuses his somewhat vague analysis on the growth of
NGO activity – organizations that have increasingly taken over basic social service
provision - and suggests that where greater numbers of NGOs are operating in a state,
their activities are a reflection of weak state capacity to meet the basic needs of its
people.61 Matanga challenges the popular perception that NGOs are “good”, autonomous,
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accountable, and representative of civil society; instead, he surmises that NGOs are but
an appendage of externally imposed anti-state development programs.62 Ferguson
likewise commented on the range of NGOs funded by Western agencies to sponsor
neoliberal interventions and bypass uncooperative governments, revealing that NGOS
may be less “non-governmental” than they would like to let off.63 However, the roles of
NGOs vary substantially and it would be misleading to group them together with other
external institutions such as the World Bank.
A similar “weak state thesis” was advanced by Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu to
explain state policymaking in response to the declining flow of external aid, while
making a case for the positive effects of investment liberalization on employment and
FDI.64 Because net development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa had fallen by 41%
between 1990 and 2001, financially unstable governments are purportedly turning to
foreign investment (and capital account liberalization) to fill the “resource gap” left by
aid organizations pulling out.65 Though their explanation is seemingly logical and
compelling (certainly worth testing), the trend upon which their analysis rests is obsolete
and not entirely useful today. According to the OECD, official development aid (ODA)
to sub-Saharan Africa actually surpassed historic records in 2010 - $26.5 billion.66 The
figure in 1990 was only $17 billion. Furthermore, while Nasang’o and Matanga’s
analyses are historically grounded, they do not draw from current trends, case studies, or
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methodological work. Moreover, Nasang’o exaggerates the democratic gains made; many
states have slipped back into one-party rule following multi-party elections.
To dispute the “weak state” thesis, Lauren MacLean’s comparative work on
patterns of non-state social welfare provision in West Africa compares the growth and
spread of informal reciprocity networks in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire.67 Her findings
suggest that the instance of neoliberal state retrenchment following structural adjustment
led many scholars to overemphasize the growth of informal networks of reciprocity in the
alleged “vacuum” left by the state; in many local areas, less and less people are actually
participating in these voluntary associations. Her analysis challenges the portrayal of the
retrenched African state as “weak” or “failing” by demonstrating how firstly, informal
institutions often interact with the state and secondly, states have shifted policies to reextend control into rural areas. She concludes that it is crucial to identify each state’s
idiosyncratic trajectory of social and economic policies to better grasp the variant
experiences of state power at the local level. MacLean never suggests external imposition
of policies, but instead highlights formal and informal linkages – how states will use
policies to “shape the composition of the new groups of winners and losers and how they
come together to change the unwritten rules of the game.”68 Matching up, Matanga and
Nasang’o’s “weak state” approach is insufficient to describe how African states use
policies to regain control over non-state reciprocity networks.
Agency theorists and the neo-patrimonial thesis
MacLean’s insights lead smoothly into the less subtle “agency” camp – in
particular Taylor, Soderbaum, and Keen. In response to Matanga’s claim – that African
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state leaders have been forced in desperation to sacrifice economic growth for political
survival – these scholars would claim that ruling parties are not necessarily victims but
active agents pursuing one-party rule and skirting on development functions. Both Taylor
and Soderbaum attempted to explain why African governments were pursuing
regionalism or regional governance under the neoliberal umbrella. Soderbaum
distinguishes between three types of regional governance strategies (separate political
interests, effectively) and how these different political goals qua types of governance
overlap, in the same manner that African political authority is shaped at the state,
regional, and global levels.69 Regional projects, he concludes, serve interests of the
powerful and wealthy at multiple levels but may also be driven by a lack of resources left
for African ruling elites to plunder within their own national economies.70 In this way, he
nearly accepts the “weak state thesis”, but under the separate pretense of greater agency
on the part of elites. Taylor, on the other hand, takes a less nuanced approach. He firmly
begins his analysis by stating that African elites are the major causes of social and
economic detriment on the continent, though they may often try to depict themselves as
victims of adjustment, colonialism, or other externally-driven factors.71 Using
Millennium Development Goals and degree of aid conditionality as a reference point for
his argument, Taylor asserts that ruling elites exploit neoliberal policies for political
advantage.
However, in line with Soderbaum’s argument, Taylor also posits that because
elites perceive their national functions have eroded, they often look to regional
expansion, identity, and complementary benefits from regionalism. Overall, though he
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mentions South Africa as having a major influence on Mozambican economic policy with
regards to regionalism and opening trade corridors, he ultimately concedes that these
developments are all policy choices relating to “embedded neoliberal strategies of
accumulation.”72 This stance is not unfamiliar in other scholarship. David Keen,
perplexed by the resumption of neoliberal reforms following Sierra Leone’s civil war (a
conflict fed in part by liberalization policies), suggested that the country’s so-called
compliance to post-war restructuring – as guided by IFIs – was actually posturing on the
part of elites. Drawing on the work of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, he explains
the move to reform with their concept “politics of the mirror”, where aid partners and
IFIs are placated by elites who give the impression or appearance of reform, but instead
devote financial resources to private accumulation and violent preservation of power.73
Chabal’s theory lies very close to the heart of the “neo-patrimonial” thesis, which
grew popular in the late 1990s, holding sway among many scholars of African politics,
while even oddly featuring “extensively and casually” in discussions conducted by IFIs,
donor agencies, NGOs, and think tanks.74 The basic premise is that state politics and the
current state of African affairs can be explained by groups of elites competing with each
other for political dominance through vertical clientelist networks.75 Rather than
inhibiting this form of politics, liberal and neoliberal transitions are known to enhance
this behavior, even as adjustment policies and conditional aid are intended instead to
dispel most government intervention and corruption. In contrast to the pre-adjustment
developmental state, the neo-patrimonial African state is anti-developmental, predatory,
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colludes with business elites, and privatizes public resources for the personal enrichment
of the party-state apparatus.76 Jean-Francois Bayart helped to diffuse this line of
scholarship with his seminal work “Africa in the world: a history of extraversion”,
published in 2010.77 In this astute work, Bayart draws on both the history of the colonial
era and the postcolonial era to claim that most new research on the African state points to
the African elites’ active role in maintaining conditions of dependency. They do so
specifically through a strategy of extraversion, wherein elites shift their ideological
orientations and policies to maintain a dependent relationship with the external
environment, which simultaneously affords them opportunities to create and capture
rent.78
The neo-patrimonial African regime was then widely viewed as institutionalized,
specific to African states, and began to take on an ambiguous air of incurable pathology
and totality. Critics have tried to move away from such generalizations, which often
obscure the contrasting ways in which rulers establish legitimate authority and
compliance from their citizens (not only along rent-seeking, clientelist lines) and how
highly developed states in the Western world arguably share many of these so-called
“African exceptionalist” patron-client characteristics.79 Slapping a singular regime type
across all African states does injustice to heterogeneous processes of state formation, the
study of regimes (where does neopatrimonial become authoritarian?), our insights about
how state reproduce themselves - a constant and fluid process that rearranges “public”,
“private”, and systems of reciprocity and exchange – and offers few solutions.
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Nevertheless, it’s a powerful paradigm to use for examining current trends in neoliberal
reforms and does not, like many neocolonial adherents, omit the complex nature of
global, state, and local interactions that complicate notions of a one-way street of
influence and exploitation from former colonial powers to postcolonial states.
Pioneering paradigms
Externalists and neo-patrimonialists no longer have ascendency; one could say
that each approach has enjoyed its height. Other scholars have offered equivalently sharp
explanations. But new approaches, while casting an intricate depth to our understanding
of African neoliberalism and policymaking, sacrifice parsimony and are more difficult to
test methodologically. The first group uses Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to describe
how neoliberal policymaking has become engrained, driven by external and internal
discursive practices. In this vein, Richard Peet attributes the adoption of neoliberal
reforms and resonance in South Africa to what he calls the “colonization of discourse” by
Western policy missionaries, who interact with and train South Africa’s academicinstitutional-media (AIM) complex.80 As South Africa switched from pursuing growth
through redistribution to a policy of redistribution through growth under the neoliberal
program GEAR, Peet traces this switch through the ANC’s discursive history ending with
its entanglement with the globally hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism
has become monolithic in that it enjoys “intensive regulatory power” and symbolic
wherewithal in its “persuasive political ideals.”81 His argument, however compelling,
seems to boil down to a sophisticated version of the “externalist approach” – his
conclusion is laden with remarks about the IMF and World Bank’s “stabilization” loaning
to South Africa and the influence of global capital in shaping domestic business
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interests.82 Similarly, Alison Ayers studies neoliberal democratization under the
Gramscian notion of “active consent”, first imposed but then actively internalized on the
part of “subaltern groups” in African states.83 Graham Harrison, detailing at great length
the multiple ways in which neoliberalism has been defined, points to how the economistic
core of neoliberalism is now firmly integrated into African development policy and is
entrenched as a continuous project to spread free-market relations across society in a
statist fashion.84 In essence, it reminds of us of right-wing arguments about “selfgovernance”, rational decision-making on the part of autonomous individuals, and
voluntary social service networks filling in the gaps where the state should supposedly
withdraw. So internalized is this framework that it has leapt into all policy spheres.
Harrison goes further:
The result of all this is that a profusion of development policy innovations has
emerged on the base of a consolidated institutional continuity largely defined by
a nexus of institutions, ideas, and personal relationships between the IFIs, donors
and debtor states. Thus the short history of neoliberalism in Africa is one of
expanding and increasingly ‘social’ remit and the development of a cluster of
agencies that advocate the neoliberal agenda – largely external but also based
within African states themselves, and especially presidencies, ministries of
finance, and central banks.85

Institutional continuity is a convincing paradigm, especially if we were to analyze the
rhetoric and reports released by officials and measure the extent that ruling parties
generate this discourse internally. Adesina follows Harrison’s lead. He writes that
between 1980 and 2000, the neoliberal policy regimes were first imposed and directed by
donor communities. However, now the level of intrusiveness is dependent on “the
ideological affinity between local state-agents and external policy merchants, and the

82

Peet, 2002, pg. 79.
Ayers, 2006, pg. 322.
84
Harrison, 2005, pg. 1307-1308.
85
Harrison, 2005, 1307-1308.
83

35
fiscal vulnerability of the client state.”86 When analyzing the formation and “African
ownership” of NEPAD in another article, Adesina also invokes neoliberal hegemony at
the policymaking level and adds that because structural adjustment altered the class bases
of African regimes and former movements, a bourgeois class emerged.87 It is in the
interest of the petty bourgeois to maintain its preponderance through the use of neoliberal
policymaking and its connections with external business and political networks.
The “internalization approach” has another facet that emphasizes the role of
technocrats in shaping policy. Jeffrey Chwieroth examined why governments in
emerging markets were willing to liberalize capital controls, arguing that “one critical
mechanism shaping policy decisions is the formation of a coherent team of neoliberal
economists”.88 Even while financial intermediaries may disagree on the possible effects
of liberalization, policymakers adhering to the “credibility model” may be swayed by
liberalization to signal to foreign investors, creditors, and donors of the government’s
creditworthiness and commitment to a policy orientation.89 These interests, mixed with
political goals, make officials from a coherent party likely to appoint neoliberal
economists. Following an “epistemic communities” approach and employing sweeping
quantitative methods, Chwieroth highlights the pivotal role that a technocratic team of
economists can play by diffusing policies and ideas to ruling parties where the salience of
ideas depend on whether or not they complement political interests. It is incredibly
insightful for understanding how policymakers come to understand what their interests
are, and this may involve the lurking influence of external actors. Harrison also referred

86

Adesina, 2009, pg. S39.
Adesina, 2004, pg. 125, 139, 142.
88
Chwieroth, 2007, pg. 443.
89
Chwieroth, 2007, pg. 446.

87

36
to the shift of neoliberal cabals from external entities to bases within the state –
presidencies, ministries of finance, and central banks.90 Bram Buscher, in his analysis of
conservation and tourist projects in Southern Africa came to similar conclusions: elites
will shape debates about policy in market terms to avoid political stigma attached to
“redistribution” or “inequality” – instead referring to the infallible, scientific expertise of
technocrats.91
James Ferguson has written extensively about Africa within a “neoliberal global
order”, where membership in the world economy is less about seamless connection
presupposed by certain meta-narratives, and more about status and privilege. To analyze
neoliberal reforms in Africa, scholars must overhaul the opposition between the
neoliberal state and the Keynesian welfare state, as both do little to account for the
majority of Africans that are not formal wage laborers and operate in the informal sector
or the “hard-to-categorize urban improvisers at society’s margins.”92 New configurations
of government power, where the state occupies certain functions and NGOs take over
other crucial functions erodes traditional conceptions of governance as centralized within
state institutions (it can be both “weak” and “strong” simultaneously). Perhaps the most
crucial point that Ferguson makes, over and against a strict neo-patrimonial account, is
that in regards to social policy and poverty, the government does not simply ignore these
issues or leaves it to the “free market”, but may instead have grown accustomed to and
relies upon the welfare interventions of NGOs and philanthropic organizations.93 A truly
market-based governance. Moreover, in accordance with Opoku’s work, a neo-
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patrimonial state would certainly not adopt reforms that would create an autonomous
capitalist class; a group accumulating wealth independent of the state would prove
threatening to the ruling party.94 Only when there is a strong state-business alliance
would the neo-patrimonial thesis hold water where economic reforms, ceding control and
autonomy to a business class, are concerned.
Theories on neoliberalism as they relate more to trends in elite policymaking and
less to the well-worn discussion of the effects of these policies show a fusion rather than
a split between externalist and neopatrimonial analyses. Recent conclusions impart the
picture of global forces and the African state interacting in a way altogether different
from the structural adjustment era. The African state uses neoliberalism in different ways
- for productive and counterproductive ends - disciplined (also to varying degrees) by an
influential transnational framework. When analyzing Mozambique’s neoliberal
governmentality, I will attempt to analyze reforms related to commercial agricultural
investments within both an externalist framework and a neo-patrimonial framework,
while also noting how reforms are socially mediated within Frelimo’s ranks and require
an understanding of the party’s relationship with the domestic business class.

Methods
Why do African elites choose neoliberal development policies? Also, do elites
pursue them because they are dependent on external forces (e.g. IMF, World Bank,
bilateral aid donors from former colonial states)? Or do they choose them because the
investments are easy to control and distribute rents to the ruling party to maintain regime
stability and a patron-client system? The instance of “land grabbing” provides new terrain
94
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for testing the degree of autonomy that African policymakers enjoy and the extent to
which a neoliberal governmentality is tied to conditions of dependency. In Mozambique,
I will first employ process tracing to illustrate how three waves of liberal reforms brought
Frelimo from a Stalinist-Leninist state through multi-party democracy and back to oneparty rule under the auspices of Western donors and international financial organizations.
I hypothesize that foreign influence declined since the end of the Cold War and civil war
in Mozambique, and expect to see the ruling party make decisions either against full
liberalization or for strictly political ends. Second, I will analyze current reforms to the
Land Law as well as the process through which the government appropriates land and
approves foreign leases, relating these insights to the neo-patrimonial hypothesis. I would
expect to see local and high-level elites using these policies to award themselves land and
not fully privatizing land, as bilateral donors have pushed for. Third, I will test the
externalist approach by comparing trends in aid/loans, conditionality, extent of
liberalization using rankings from “Doing Business”, corruption rankings, and reports on
the relationship between the ruling party and domestic capitalist class. Based on these
findings and the commentary of scholars reporting on aid and Mozambique, I would
expect conditionality to be lax, corruption rankings to be high, rankings in “Doing
Business” to be low, and a strong connection between the ruling party and business class.

“Orthodoxy” to “reform”: post-revolutionary Mozambique
Liberal reforms, both political and economic, have appeared in fits and bursts
throughout Frelimo’s rule after independence in 1975. But we can encompass the
adjustments within three identifiable waves: membership in the IMF and World Bank in
1984 (structural adjustment), multiparty elections in 1994 and neoliberal reforms in the
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late 1990s, and the current wave of neoliberal practices. But most curious in this recent
junction is the simultaneous, systematic reversal of political liberalization and the more
informal character of neoliberal reforms. Abandoning – however discretely – Frelimo’s
commitment to electoral democracy by enacting stringent regulations on the participation
of smaller opposition parties, the ruling party seems intent to re-blur state and party
lines.95 Frelimo’s historic transfiguration was at first guided by necessity and dependency
on foreign donors and IFIs, in line with the externalist thesis. In the 1990s, it is clear that
the ruling party challenges external influences to its policymaking. Frelimo’s trajectory
as a revolutionary movement and ruling party, first amenable to and later reaping benefits
from liberal reforms, will be detailed in this section to demonstrate that for Frelimo’s
political survival in the 1980s and 1990s, liberal reform was a sine qua non. Frelimo’s
initial experience with liberalization laid the foundations for and offer important insights
into current neoliberal reforms, where there is continuity (e.g. steady relationships with
bilateral donors) and also discontinuity. Altogether, the blatant objective underlying the
character of the latter two reform periods is consistent with my thesis: Frelimo pivots its
position on policymaking to secure the survival and superiority of the party. Its tight
relationship with a capitalist/entrepreneurial class enables it to pursue reforms without
risking threats to its power base.

Figure 1.0: Frelimo & Three Waves of Liberalization in Mozambique
socialist orthodoxy -> Wave 1: economic reform -> Wave 2: political reform -> Wave 3:

(one party rule)

1975-1984
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Whither liberation or revolution?
After the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, an instrumental leader during
Frelimo’s emergence in the 1960s, the younger “revolutionary” faction ignited a decisive
ideological shift within the liberation front. As the anti-colonial struggle against the
Portuguese intensified, the “anti-revolutionary wing” within the core leadership of the
movement was abruptly subordinated to an explicitly Marxist-Leninist agenda.96
Educated refugees returning from Tanzania sought to articulate a program that was not
limited to mere political revolution and independence, but one that encompassed greater
socioeconomic transformations for the country. Frelimo’s “newly liberated zones” in the
North served as experimental rehearsals for practicing desired forms of production –
involving collectivist pilot projects, health clinics, and schools.97 These projects
broadened Frelimo’s support base to include peasants, workers, chiefs, and elites. But
Frelimo mistakenly confused the enthusiasm and anti-imperialism of the movement’s
supporters with consensus on its revolutionary agenda. Certain elements of centralized
planning were widely accepted during the advent of the revolution. However, due to a
variety of grievances and crises, support for the socialist regime deteriorated during its
first decade of rule. Foreign and domestic hostility toward the increasingly isolated oneparty vanguard state would conclusively, combined with poor economic conditions and
drought, necessitate the first wave of liberal reforms.

Destabilization era
Widespread disease, poverty, a pronounced lack of education, racial/ethnic
cleavages, and wartime debt were major and widely noted obstacles for Frelimo.
Moreover, to forge national unity amidst ethnic and regional particularism was a chore,
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made more tedious by resentment to southern dominance in Frelimo’s already privileged
minority leadership.98 And in 1975, 80% of the population lived in rural poor areas and
90% were illiterate.99 With meager resources and few personnel, Frelimo struggled to
extend its presence and basic services to each region. This made urban areas easier to
manage but left rural communities – the majority – neglected (as mentioned above). The
immediate exodus of 51,000 Portuguese people – that is, most of the skilled labor,
managerial capacity, and economic advisors – also left the economy in shambles.100 Yet
these economic troubles were not, as Peter Utting suggests, the sole impetus for adopting
pragmatic liberal reforms.101 As the Third Party Congress sought rapid industrialization,
modernization, and an expanded role of the state in all sectors – it largely imported
foreign models of social and agricultural organization that did not resonate with most
Mozambicans.102
Seeds of resentment sprung from unpopular social engineering schemes that
uprooted rural populations and negatively shaped their perceptions toward socialism.
Initially, grievances erupted when religious and oppositional groups were outlawed and
party leaders from northern and central regions faced expulsion. But Frelimo went even
further. Mondlane and his followers viewed Marxism as the proper antithesis of anticolonialism and traditional African practices.103 Following independence, Frelimo
leadership thus dismantled and abolished these deeply-instilled traditional hierarchies.
Archambault, in his review, noted that the forced demise of chiefly rule (more than any
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other factor) drove scores of peasants to support the brutal insurgent campaign of
Renamo.104 Additionally, these peasants were forced into a collectivized agricultural
system involving poorly managed and resource-strapped state-farms, which also had little
relation to previous ways in which production was socially organized.105 On the one
hand, nationalization of land in 1976 was applauded because it did not initially disrupt
peasants’ occupation of ancestral lands or the plots they used productively. On the other
hand, attempts to organize peasants into collectivized, state farming schemes were met
with noncompliance and defection to Renamo.106 Though the peasantry had been the
backbone of support for Frelimo’s armed struggle, services and food staples were
extended almost exclusively to urban classes, thus marginalizing rural communities.
Frelimo was, throughout the first decade of rule, preoccupied with creating an urban
working class and industrial sector as well as directing most agricultural investment into
the large, capital-intensive state farms (former colonial farms) and leaving the smaller
semi-mechanized collectives cash-strapped (Bowen 1993; O’Laughlin 1995). Though the
colonial administration’s legacies of forced labor and cash cropping were abolished,
Frelimo’s radical discontinuity with prevailing systems of social organization and
production in the countryside would fuel insurgency and later, massive dislocation.
Rural grievances would prove ample for the foreign-backed Renamo to launch a
violent campaign against the ruling Marxist-Leninist party. Other alienated groups in
peri-urban or urban areas joined too, as social mobility became increasingly restricted to
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Frelimo party members. The sixteen-year-long civil war that ensued was fueled by the
white minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia and drained over 35% of
Frelimo’s already dwindling resources.107 Nation-building took a backseat and the ruling
party had to seriously reconsider its agenda as rebels moved swiftly through the Manica
and Sofala provinces and closed in around the southern capital. Renamo posed a powerful
threat; its movement defended traditional leadership, religious beliefs of rural and nonsouthern communities, and sought to paint Frelimo’s socialist system as inherently hostile
to African society.108 However, this period of destabilization (1977-1989) would not
prove entirely ruinous for Frelimo – the party would endure under the auspices of
Western institutions and assistance.
First Wave of Reform: the 1980s
When a host of domestic grievances became infused with external aggression, the
costly and bloody conflict that followed would force Frelimo to make its first liberal
shifts. Frelimo was desperate for funds and assistance: over a 5-year period, Mozambique
ran a trade deficit of over $40 million and a 17% decline in GNP.109 Hence, the party was
compelled to join the World Bank and IMF in 1983, and under that institutional guidance
and pressure would later launch its IMF-sponsored PRE or Programa de Reabilitação
Económica in 1987.110 Austerity measures implemented during this phase of the civil war
resulted in lower wages, a devalued currency, and greater economic downturn, even as
aid and loans flowed in.111 An infamous bundle of policies - “structural adjustment.”
SAPs were applied haphazardly and without critical reserve across the developing world,
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reflecting the World Bank’s early stance in the 1980s – that African developmental woes
are attributable to over-extended states and illiberal economic policies.112 Obviously, this
wasn’t necessarily the case for Mozambique. Where Frelimo had made impressive gains
in health and education before the war, during the mid-1980s, 35% of government
spending was diverted to the conflict and social services became sorely underfunded.113
Also, historical scrutiny suggests that the party reached out to the West for political and
economic survival while caught in the throes of a nasty, foreign-backed civil war. During
the late 1980s, with the pending dissolution of the USSR, Frelimo could no longer count
on financial and arms support from the Communist bloc.
An outline of the Fourth Party Congress’ reforms in 1983 largely centered on
providing support to cooperatives, families, and private sectors, while reducing the largescale state farms. Bowen details the four primary policy changes – that of “regional
prioritization, administrative decentralization, liberalization of commercial activity, and
allocation of resources on the bass of economic pragmatism rather than ideology.”114
Regional prioritization translated into directing more resources and credit to small scale
farmers so to reverse the systematic neglect of rural populations and regain support for
Frelimo. But policy is one thing and implementation another; combined with adjustment
policies that deregulated markets and prices, major social and economic tolls hit rural and
poor urban populations and new programs were hard-pressed to reach Renamo
strongholds in the countryside. As aid pledges fell between 1987 and 1990, coinciding
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with an official break with military assistance from Moscow, Frelimo was forced to
negotiate with Renamo in direct talks to end the war in 1990.115
Second and Third Waves
Consistent with the neopatrimonial thesis that takes the African state in the postCold War era as its focal point – that is, the state as embedded in social relations that
span global and local spheres – democratic reforms would prove strategic for Frelimo to
maintain its role as the dominant organization for political access and social mobility in
Mozambique. At first glance, multiparty politics would appear to weaken the party
apparatus, pursued not for survival but under the pervasive influence of external actors as
a condition for the peace process. Nevertheless, when direct talks began between Frelimo
and Renamo in July of 1990, the primary factors outlined by scholars to explain
Frelimo’s acquiescence to multiparty elections were varied: vulnerability due to the
party’s exclusivity and lack of presence across the central and northern provinces and its
stalemate with Renamo (Sumich 683); chaos in the Soviet Union, which led to an official
end to military and economic support to Frelimo in 1989-1990; and the need for
legitimacy, authority, and power in the eyes of both the domestic population and
international constituents. It follows that the new constitution adopted in 1990 would
briefly break the state and party apart. As one-party rule dissolved and Marxist-Leninist
principles were officially abandoned in the 5th Party Congress, Frelimo attempted to
expand its membership and include religious leaders and business owners.116 Under the
mantle of the 1990 multi-party constitution, party and state were briefly separated and
compelled Frelimo to reorganize its support base – namely, shifting from a working
class-peasant alliance to an alliance with the domestic capitalist class (Simpson 1993).
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Various multinational corporations negotiated with the state for concessionary contract
farming schemes (often with local companies) and South African capital and goods
flooded the country.117 International donors, who had previously financed Frelimo’s
conversion to a political party as a condition of the group’s full participation in the peace
process, now pressured for privatization of land (Bowen 1992; Manning 2010;
O’Laughlin 1995).
This pressure, combined with postwar reconstruction, resettlement of rural
groups, and coordination of agricultural production merged into a national land law
debate spanning 1995 -1997, and resulted in the approval of Lei de Terras 19/97 - the
new Land Law. Changes to issues involving land were few; the 1990 multi-party
constitution that Frelimo adopted as a requirement of the peace settlement permitted the
selling or mortgaging of land. All land and soil was to be controlled by the national
government, which would in turn determine conditions of land use (Articles 35, 46-47).
Assessing how the Land Law has been applied since it was passed shows discrepancies
that call forth explanations from both the externalist and neo-patrimonial theses. Factions
of Frelimo wavered between creating a new system of individual land titles and
reinstalling a system of communal tenure under the oversight of district administrations
(regulos).118 It is unclear which system would best spur smallholder production, though
this was not the immediate concern for Frelimo. The latter route was finally chosen to reextend state-party control; that is, current district officials or regulos are usually loyal
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elites placed by Frelimo that act seldom on the part of the communities they represent but
are placed for surveillance and to ensure the implementation of the party’s agenda. For
instance, in the case of foreign agricultural investments, district officials – in exchange
for a facilitation fee - will often approve projects in spite of broader opposition within the
community (dos Reis interview). A few South African ranchers, seeking only 1,000 ha in
the Manica province along the Buzi River, were denied an allocation from district
authorities until a friend of theirs had the provincial governor intervene on their behalf
(McCarter interview).
Though the process was internationally commended for its transparency and
democratic character, because the Land Law does not require local communities with
“overriding” use-rights to request delimitation and receive a title (or DUAT) to their
lands, investors must merely consult a village leader or district official, whose sole
approval may secure the title or lease for the investor. Conversely, if more communities
were formally registered – and approximately 16% are countrywide – their titles ensure
that an interested investor must instead negotiate directly with the community whereby
the investor would enter into a contract with the village and not the government (OI
2011; JA/UNAC 2011). But according to Hanlon, between 1997 and 2002, no contracts
had been proffered (2004). It is now clear that: both formal titles and use rights are
transferable, but because each is distinguished by a different process and because
transferring unregistered land use rights is conducted by local officials (not
communities), control over lease negotiations and transfers has been successfully
centralized within Frelimo’s internal structures (McCarter interview). Therefore, Frelimo
party elites may benefit from the widespread ignorance and lack of community DUAT
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registration. The World Bank and IMF direct these concerns toward the behavior of
MNCs and not necessarily the full implementation and regulation of government policies
that would otherwise protect communities. It is no wonder that small-scale agricultural
production cannot grow under such neglect and restraint, and it should neither be
surprising that family farming is dominant – associations and cooperatives that register
must pay taxes on the land, and many can’t afford to. What little incentive families do
have to organize on a larger scale to supply more to local markets is further impeded by
the effect of food aid on prices for local farmers.119 As foreign investors enjoy a package
of tax-free benefits, no fees on imported equipment, and a 50-year lease, while swept
along by elites posing as representatives at the district level, the growth of this informal
market for land ineluctably reveals what Lunstrum calls a “seemingly contradictory type
of neoliberal state space” (2008; Fairbairn 2011; Meikle interview).
Evaluating the Land Law
The Land Law, seemingly diffuse with the aim to strike a balance between
encouraging investment and protecting peasants’ rights and access land, has proved less
than impartial. Though no interviewees, when asked, had heard of any land conflicts and
were not troubled by foreign leases, they admitted that smallholders were systematically
marginalized by a registration process whose procedures had become more complicated,
if they were even familiar with the process.120 And this tweaking, coupled with virtually
nonexistent access to loans from the central banks, has made it impossible for many to
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move beyond subsistence farming. Vegetable sellers (many who sell produce from South
Africa) spoke enthusiastically of working on commercial farms in the face of 23-25%
loans interest rates and because funding for small/medium-scale farms is widely believed
to be funneled to Frelimo party members (Meikle interview). Approval for new projects
has been streamlined in recent years after much of the previous red tape has since been
cleared. Fortunately, and in contrast to many claims made by NGOs and other “neocolonial” adherents, they are required to conduct consultations and provide health
centers, schools, and wells, but the government does not provide the personnel for those
services (dos Reis interview; McCarter interview). Moreover, officials speak of the need
for special treatment and incentives for large-scale investors and for infrastructural work
to be done only so that skilled farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe will also agree
to farm in Mozambique, while mentioning nothing about strategies to increase incentives
for smallholders (Xavier interview).
Over 2.67 million hectares of land were either transferred or in negotiation by
2009, or 405 documented projects in total (Deininger et al 2010). Many more project
proposals are awaiting approval, following the current Agricultural Zoning Process
(2009-2011) to revalue vast swathes of public land, during which time a freeze of largescale investments has been imposed. Many of these leases are granted to Mozambican
companies and investors, but the land awarded, while conveniently located near cities,
ports, and crucial infrastructure is often transferred by party elites with DUATs to the
prime real estate in question (McCarter interview). After the uproar at the Fifth Party
Congress’ removal of personal investment and accumulation restrictions for party
members in 1989, now market-inspired policies newly justify removing restrictions and
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enable elites to expropriate land and seek new avenues for personal enrichment, while
making it seem “foreign-driven”. Having previously taken advantage of cheap land by
registering their own claims to DUATs, party elites will often sit on valuable land and
negotiate leases with investors themselves. South African investors have also bought land
with similar motivations, and attempted to sell parcels at inflated prices – transferring
money and documents outside of the government framework entirely (McCarter
interview; Fairbairn 2011). Luckily, Frelimo has been clamping down on this activity and
forcing companies out where they do not meet agreed timeframes for developing the
land.121 Nevertheless, are these processes better explained by the externalist approach or
the neo-patrimonial approach? The latter seems to represent (to a more accurate degree)
the balance of internal and external influences on reforms – especially how they are
carried out.
The current situation in Mozambique is most precarious. While NGOs seem to be
organizing in opposition to Frelimo’s investment policies, UNAC directors are
nevertheless engaged with officials to negotiate a new land law and seem to think of
Frelimo as the only channel for changing policies (dos Reis interview). They work
exhaustively to inform peasants of the registration process and even assist communities in
claiming a DUAT. Under the CEAPGRI program, Mozambican banks are now working
with foreign commercial banks to install a system of guarantees so that a long-term
investment fund can be made available to commercial farmers, though there is still no
“Land Bank” for smaller farmers absent the efforts of NGOs like TechnoServe (Xavier
interview). Furthermore, beyond food, clothing, and oil subsidies (which the government
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has been trying to remove), there is no program for the 20-30% of city dwellers that also
engage in agriculture as a principle activity (dos Reis interview). When the question of
smallholders and subsistence farmers is brought up, solutions are spoken of in terms of
encouraging outgrower schemes or cooperation amongst farmers. Under the neoliberal
framework, programs, funding, and services for small farmers are delegated to other
organizations, creating a configuration of governance where certain responsibilities are
no longer part of Frelimo’s agenda. Lastly, where privilege has been reorganized in terms
of credit access for foreign investors or wealthy domestic investors, the accompanying
reorganization of space and land is also identifiable. The Zoning Process, mean to “better
orient” investors by creating a more detailed map of the land in fertile provinces by
increasing the scale of the map four-fold, will assess and redefine land in terms of
commercial use (Xavier 2011). We have yet to see the full implications of this
profoundly neoliberal governmentality, as it is being played out in Mozambique’s
courting of foreign investors today. However, it is clear that pointing only or mostly to
external influences (investors, World Bank, IMF, and donors), who allegedly promote
full democratic and economic liberalization and yet do nothing to rescind aid or loans
when Frelimo does not meet these conditions, cannot explain why investments and the
Land Law have obviously aided the party and its patron-client networks more than
investors. It is also unclear whether or not SAPs succeeded in “rolling back the state” in
Mozambique, besides eroding its sovereignty through enforcement of fiscal restrictions
and other arbitrary controls on state policymaking.122 Indeed, as Frelimo agreed to adopt
liberal reforms in exchange for external funding, this served paradoxically to “roll out”
state power or entrench its control over access to resources.
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Assessing the externalist approach to elite policymaking
This paper previously explored current trends in foreign agricultural investment in
Africa (dubbed “land grabbing”) and their necessary association with neoliberal reforms
pursued by African states to encourage the inflow of foreign capital. Using process
tracing to detail the factors driving economic and political liberalization in Mozambique,
it is clear that across the identifiable “three waves” of reform, the actors and forces that
have historically influenced the implementation of neoliberal reforms have changed and
are clearly more nuanced in the current era, as the neo-patrimonial thesis would suggest.
For instance, changes to the Land Law and the ubiquitously informal process by which
foreign investors are allocated land and receive privileged access to credit through local
elites suggest that a purely “externalist” approach may be insufficient to capture the
constellations of power and influence involved in “land grabbing” and neoliberal reform.
State-sponsored contradictions, partial reforms, and informal practices taken by ruling
elites to allocate land reveal a complicated portrait of reforms to land and investment
policies as mediated by forces both “inside” and “outside” the state. Thus, in our
investigation of the forces that shape policymaking/reform in Africa, a more robust
understanding of the African state and governance is required. This has been described at
great length in current literature on neoliberalism. The two approaches used
predominantly in Africanist literature give disparate pictures, and it is my intent to test
the externalist approach in this section.
I. The Externalist Approach
Neoliberal reforms associated with foreign agricultural investments are not
pursued; they are imposed on African states via aid and loan conditionality. If this
explanation remains rigorous today, we would expect to see a higher degree of aid
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conditionality, penalties, and aid flows that would change according to the extent of
democratic and economic liberalization. Land and credit access would predominantly
favor foreign investors. Conditions for liberalization will show continuity between the era
of adjustment and current trends in reform.
Independent variables
1. Degree of fiscal weakness of the state, measured by changes in the proportion
of annual state expenditure provided by aid and changes in GDP/GNI
2. Degree of conditionality attached to aid and the presence/absence of penalties
when a state fails to meet requirements for political and economic
liberalization
3. Degree that changes to aid flows match changes in economic and political
liberalization
Results
At first glance, the externalist hypothesis is compelling because Mozambique is
among the most dependent of the “donor darlings”, sporting a ratio of aid to GNI that is
almost four times the average for sub-Saharan Africa.123 Using data gathered from the
OECD on General Budget Support and Total Aid in Mozambique, it is evident that when
the % of aid as a proportion of GNI (or gross national income) increases, this in turn
reflects the fiscal weakness of the state. Simply stated, a state that maintains a stable level
of GDP growth - or shows increases in GDP relative to aid inflows - would be somewhat
more fiscally “strong” as aid is intended to spur sustained economic growth in developing
states with lower GDPs. A state that is more fiscally weak, under the externalist thesis, is
beholden to more foreign influence in policymaking.
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As this graph124 shows, the % of official development aid as a proportion of
Mozambique’s GNI has been decreasing, not because aid flows have decreased, but
because Mozambique’s GDP has increased exponentially in recent years. Compare $4.2
billion in 2000 to $9.6 billion in 2010.125 This graph can be misleading: although net
flows of aid actually increased from approximately $60 million to about $90 million (per
year) between 2004 and 2011, because Mozambique’s GDP has grown and foreign
investment has increased dramatically, the state is less “fiscally weak” than ever
before.126 This does not necessarily indicate that the government of Mozambique has
more autonomy in policymaking (though there is more output unrelated to aid), but that
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the externalist approach, citing fiscal weakness, loses ground to recent trends. Indeed,
GDP growth in Mozambique has been increasing between 6-9% since 2001.127
Mozambique remains fiscally weak and heavily dependent on aid, but this does not
necessarily translate into no control or sovereignty in policymaking.
Variables related to aid in Africa require deeper inspection, as the aggregate
yearly flows of official development assistance are employed at the country-level in most
scholarly work, while fewer scholars analyze aid allocated toward specific local projects
at the sub-national level. However, empirical investigations into the more sophisticated
data on aid projects still seem to conclude that because the bulk of aid remains dispersed
mostly through capital cities and through the auspices of the national government, it
remains merely a form of rent that empowers the ruling party. This literature was
reflected in Findley and Powell’s analysis, in which they created a detailed map of all aid
projects across 24 African states, where geographical coordinates (varying by size and
shade depending on the amount of money involved) were assigned for each project. Of
all the states, Mozambique was the largest recipient of aid between 1989 and 2008,
totaling $28.4 billion.128 And though there are many smaller aid projects throughout the
entire country, a greater portion of aid projects are concentrated in the southern province
near Maputo and in the second largest city Beira. What does this mean for the externalist
thesis? If more aid is directed at specific and dispersed projects, foreign donors have
more control over how it is spent. Yet Carrie Manning’s most recent analysis of
Mozambique shows that trends involving donor support for specific projects has actually
decreased since 1992 and has been redirected towards national budgets, giving the
127
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government of Mozambique more freedom and flexibility in determining how the money
is spent – and thus reducing donors’ ability to influence elite behavior.129 Interestingly
enough, Manning and Malbrough argue elsewhere that the role of donors is indispensable
in immediate post-conflict states and in peace-building, but that it is unclear how
efficacious conditional aid can prove later, especially in meeting development goals set
by donors.130 This isn’t too surprising, given that Findley and Powell’s article focuses on
aid flows during years of conflict, specifically 1989-1991 in Mozambique.
We cannot dismiss the externalist thesis entirely because aid flows do remain
high. How has conditionality changed? There are a few problems with conceptualizing
aid conditionality. From the 1990s onward, “political conditionality” and democratic
reforms replaced economic reforms as the more stringent requirements for continued
assistance under the Post-Washington Consensus.131 But various studies conclude that
aid flows are known to fluctuate due to concerns not with the well-being of the economy
in question or good governance per se but with the partisan-stance of the ruling party and
its relationship with the foreign policy or geopolitical interests of donors (Gounder & Sen
1999; Cachel-Cordo & Craig 1997). Similarly, Randall Stone’s analysis concludes that
conditionality may be more or less political – that is, US aid will differ in its incentives,
principles, conditions, and priorities from German or British aid.132 Thus economic
assistance policies may often shift depending on the party in power and domestic political
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issues, as was shown in the two-game analysis of aid flows and policy by Rick Travis.133
However (and perhaps luckily enough in this case), Mozambique has been under the rule
of one party since independence. Consistent rule by one-party somewhat controls for
variation in aid that could be ascribed to changes in party rule and power. Its medley of
donors, on the other hand, is a bit more diverse. Its top donors are the World Bank (or its
“IDA”), the European Commission, the United States, and the combined weight of
Nordic states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland).
The most important analysis of aid conditionality in Mozambique does not lend
itself to clear conclusions. Hanlon’s exploration into the deep historical ties between
Frelimo party members and its aid donors reveals a complicated picture: conditionality is
more lax – that is, donors generally give budget support so that governments can “own”
their own strategies. Yet while donors have realized that they cannot force their own
political will to reduce corruption or spur governance reform, they are still ironically and
heavily involved in the policymaking process – indeed, they withheld food aid in the
1990s when World Bank and IMF policy changes were not followed through on.134
Harrison agrees with Hanlon, noting that is it “far less insightful to make distinctions
between internal and external interests” because donors will in one instance care less
about the 2004 rampant electoral fraud but successfully block the establishment of a
development bank to provide rural credit. Still, Hanlon concludes that as of the late
2000s, Frelimo may accept donor demands for liberaliation but either won’t fully
implement them, quietly reverse them later, or will not be subservient at all when
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“political and personal interests are at stake.”135 Land reform appears to be one of the
more recent outliers, as Frelimo refused to privatize land even while the party was under
considerable external pressure. President Guebuza made very clear at a USAID meeting
in 2006 that he would not privatize land, an action less passive than defiance behavior in
the past.
When Frelimo presents the face of political stability and agrees to certain –but not
all – neoliberal economic reforms, donors usually allow large-scale corruption to go
unchecked. But because donors have recently been unable or unwilling to enforce its
demands for political and economic liberalization and while Frelimo only meets demands
that do not run against the interests of its highest members, it would appear that the neopatrimonial thesis has better captured current relations in the internal-external
constellation of forces that shape policymaking and foreign leases to farmland. The case
of Mozambique runs against the conclusions of scholars who suggest that foreign aid and
budget support is halted or frozen when democratic credentials are lost or political
liberalization is not adhered to – this occurred in Ethiopia, Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras,
Madagascar and Rwanda.136

Conclusion: evaluating the approaches
Both approaches have their flaws and perhaps a synthesis between them would be
most appropriate to capture the particular blend of influences that shape neoliberal reform
in Mozambique. For instance, the concept of global neoliberal hegemony is certainly one
of the most advanced conceptualizations in theory and in the field. The neo-patrimonial
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approach can absorb this theoretical work within its own notion of dependency and postcolonial yoke.
While the externalist thesis rightly points to the deep and unbroken historical ties
between international financial institutions, aid donors, and Frelimo, the influence of
external agencies and actors has lessened to a considerable degree. This is evident in how
the character of liberal reform changed (not to mention the blatant reversal of democratic
liberal reforms) in the 1990s and 2000s. The neo-patrimonial approach does not suggest
that there is no or even insignificant influence from external forces but rather that ruling
elites often shift their positions and policies to maintain their dependency on foreign
institutions while carrying out their own agendas and maintaining patron-client relations.
De Renzio and Hanlon (2007) describes this aptly: “Mozambicans within Frelimo and in
senior government posts have developed advanced skills at managing complex relations
with a diverse range of international agencies, juggling their difference priorities and
demands, and positively responding to their agendas, while at the same time maintaining
internal political support.” The literature from neoliberalism and specifically the more
recent insights suggest that we must look at governance as networked. Where privilege
has been formally and informally reorganized in terms of credit access for foreign
investors and wealthy domestic investors, the accompanying reorganization of privilege,
space (land), and accumulation favors a group of business elites and foreign interests.
When the Fifth Party Congress removed restrictions to personal investment and
accumulation for party members in 1989, now market-inspired policies newly justify and
enable elites to expropriate land and seek new avenues for personal enrichment, while
making these policies seem “foreign-driven”.
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Future research might employ different theories and may also find that neoliberal
governance and external influences vary across African states. Other frameworks, such as
Wallerstein’s “world systems” theory and “negotiated peripheralization” could be
employed to more carefully evaluate what may be the co-optation of African states into a
world-system, a system that affords their economies a lesser status in the wider global
economy. Other work might unseat traditional views – such as the notion that the state
conflicts with the informal economy – and instead analyze the ways that African states
engage in “informalization strategies”, whereby governance is established through
connections with non-governmental entities (rebel groups, private militias, NGOs) and
through informal practices of its own elites. This may better explain how governments
“partially privatize” where they meet the demands of both their clients internally and
donors externally.
Finally, I want to stress that while a neoliberal strategy of foreign agricultural
investment for Mozambique’s food security is wildly inappropriate, rural development
strategies must be met with foreign investment. More engagement of family cooperatives
or larger associations will prove most beneficial for Mozmabique’s precarious and
gloomy food crisis.
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